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1 INTRODUCTION
Delivery of inputs to a firm does not always coincide with payment by the firm. In some
cases the supplier requires the buyer to prepay, and in other cases it allows the buyer to
make a delayed payment. A short term delay in payments is a widely observed form
of inter-firm credit. Delayed payments granted, usually called trade credit, account for
about 15% of the assets of U.S. manufacturing firms. The importance of such credit is
further underlined by its role in transmitting monetary policy shocks (see, for example,
Brechling and Lipsey (1963), Meltzer (1960) and Nilsen (2002)).
Much of inter-firm credit is supplied at zero interest. Prepayment is always a pure cash
advance, and therefore zero-interest credit. For trade credit, “net” terms are inwidespread
use. The most frequently used terms are “net 30,” requiring the buyer to repay within 30
days, again at zero interest cost to the buyer.1 Trade credit has an implicit interest cost
for the buyer only when the seller sets up a discount for early repayment,2 and the buyer
does not repay within the discount period. However, Ng, Smith and Smith (1999) report
that in 15 out of 27 industry categories, discount terms are generally not offered, and pure
net terms are used. Net terms are common across all but 4 of the other 12 categories. A re-
cent study by Burkart, Ellingsen and Giannetti (2008) reports3 that only 20% of suppliers
offer a discount and 50% of the most important suppliers do not offer them. In fact, even
for discount terms, evidence suggests that many suppliers (72% in the Ng-et al study) al-
low some customers - especially long-term ones - to take the discount so long as payment
is made within the net period, even after the discount period has elapsed.
The literature has often focused on a purely financial motivation for providing trade
credit and considers the cost implicit in discount terms when repayment is not made
within the discount period. This ignores pure net terms. Further, even in the case of
discount terms, if the sole purpose were to impose a high interest rate, it would be far
simpler to specify a standard loan contract at a high rate. But such terms are not ob-
served anywhere in the developed world. Instead, every trade credit agreement includes
1As discussed later, an indirect cost can arise through simultaneous input price adjustments. However,
the important point is that there is an element of inventory subsidy in trade credit and prepayment that
changes the marginal incentives.
2For example, a 2% discount for payment within 10 days may be added to a net 30 term.
3The Ng et al. (1999) study uses COMPUSTAT firms (i.e. relatively large publicly traded firms), while
Burkart et al. (2008) use data from National Survey of Small Business Finances.
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a zero interest period lasting 10-60 days.
Whywould a supplier of inputs provide short term credit at zero interest to its customers?
We propose a simple theory of trade credit as a subsidy mitigating a negative externality.
A downstream firm trades off inventory holding costs against lost sales. Lost final sales
impose a negative externality on an upstream firm, which supplies inputs. However, the
upstream firm can induce the downstream firm to internalize the externality by allowing
delayed payments, which delivers an inventory subsidy. Our model accounts for the use
of delayed payment for inputs (trade credit) as well as prepayment for inputs, which
mitigates a reverse externality. We compare these policies with those based on varying
the price of the input, which can also deliver a similar subsidy, and clarify when either
type of policy is optimal.
A common argument advanced in justifying trade credit is that the input suppliers are
better informed/can better monitor their customers compared to banks. An important
paper by Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) reviews this literature concisely and provides a
cogent critique. They argue that the key advantage of trade credit is that it is advanced
via illiquid inputs. The commitment value of such inputs ameliorates the vulnerability of
liquid funds to misuse. As they point out, this corrects a weakness in the earlier monitor-
ing literature since it fails to explain why trade credit is limited to the value of inputs. In
the Burkart-Ellingsen theory the illiquidity of the trade credit instrument automatically
ties the credit to the value of inputs. However, since the illiquidity of inputs is critical,
the theory cannot explain the practice of prepayment which is similar to (reverse) trade
credit, but is an advance of liquid cash rather than illiquid inputs.
One explanation for prepayment in the context of developing countries is that it is a re-
sponse to default risk. However, in developedwestern economies, often large, well estab-
lished firms prepay suppliers, which cannot be explained by appealing to default risk4.
Therefore, to us the challenge is to simultaneously explain (a) both trade credit (input ad-
vances by the upstream firm) and prepayment (cash advances by the downstream firm),
(b) why all such advances are limited by the value of inputs (we call this “the Burkart-
Ellingsen critique”), and (c) why most trade credit is offered at zero interest. We also
attempt to shed light on the choice between price cuts and trade credit and how these
4As Schwartz (1974) and Ferris (1981) note, prepayment is observed in construction, shipbuilding, air-
craft and parts of the defense industries. Typically, in such cases, the probability of default or non-collection
is zero. Prepayment clauses are also often used in North American oil and gas contracts.
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might be combined.5
Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) show that net terms can arise if both up and downstream
firms are credit constrained. Provision of trade credit ameliorates an underlying moral
hazard problem and eases this constraint by allowing the upstream firm to borrow against
accounts receivable. Since the division of accounts receivable into interest and principal
does not matter, net terms arise.6
We adopt a different approach based on lost-sales externalities experienced by one firm
because the other optimally decides to delay production. Since trade credit (and pre-
payment) arises as a subsidy that solves an externality, the interest charges are naturally
zero for both credit constrained firms as well as large unconstrained upstream firms with
significant market power.
In our model a downstream firm facing stochastic final demand can either produce im-
mediately after each sale, or wait for one or more periods before producing. If the down-
stream firm finds it profitable to follow a waiting strategy, it might lose some sales, gen-
erating a negative externality for the upstream firm. We show that by subsidizing the
downstream firm’s inventory holding, delayed payment (trade credit) induces the down-
stream firm to internalize the externality. The theory extends to reverse trade credit, i.e.
prepayment, which arises when the upstream firm wants to wait, generating a negative
externality for the downstream firm.
Further, the bank rate represents the opportunity cost of inventory holding. Therefore
waiting is optimal when the bank rate is relatively high. Since a high bank rate is one of
the factors that can causewaiting, a bank loan (at this high rate) cannot solve the problem
of negative externality. To dissuade the downstream firm from waiting, a loan must be
provided at a subsidized rate - which lowers the cost of immediate production and makes
waiting less attractive. Such a subsidy is naturally bounded above by the value of inputs.
Thus our theory is not subject to the Burkart-Ellingsen critique mentioned above. To
summarize, the solution to the problem of waiting is a loan at a subsidized rate covering
at most the value of inputs - and trade credit is precisely such an instrument. This clarifies
5Indeed, as Burkart et al. (2008) note, “Existing theories fail to explainwhy suppliers provide trade credit
to customers with bargaining power instead of offering (larger) price reductions.” A contribution of our
paper is to attempt to address precisely such concerns.
6As a referee has pointed out to us, the argument can be strengthened further: if loans cannot be secured
against any trade credit interest, the optimal trade credit interest is zero.
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the reason for providing credit at a zero interest rate which is lower than the bank rate.
This is also consistent with the fact (reported by Ng et al. (1999)) that trade credit interest
rate does not vary with either the bank rate or market demand fluctuations.
However, such a subsidy can also be delivered by varying the input price. Thus while
our model can account for trade credit, another question remains: is there a reason to
use trade credit in preference to price variation? To answer this, we assume that the in-
put price is fully effective in the sense that price adjustment by an upstream firm does
not induce (potential) rivals to react to the adjustment. We then show that whenever
the cost of capital facing the up and downstream firms are different, price-based and
delayed/advance-payment-based policies result in different outcomes. Specifically, sup-
pose the downstream firm has an incentive to switch away from immediate production,
and the upstream firm wants to offer an inventory subsidy to prevent the problem. We
show that if the upstream firm faces a relatively lower cost of capital, trade credit Pareto
dominates price discounts. The optimal solution is to advance full trade credit (defer the
entire payment for a unit of input), and simultaneously raise the price to the highest level
consistent with satisfying the downstream participation constraint. On the other hand,
if the downstream firm faces a lower cost of capital, price discounts generate a higher
surplus, and the optimal policy is to lower the input price to the level necessary to induce
immediate production, and offer no trade credit. Further, if we relax the assumption of
fully effective price adjustments, the scope of trade credit increases further to cover even
some cases in which the upstream firm faces worse credit terms compared to the down-
stream firm.
Which policy–full trade credit or a pure price discount–is more likely to be optimal? We
show that the scope for delivering an inventory subsidy arises when the upstreammargin
is higher compared to the downstream margin. Further, we argue that such an upstream
firm is likely to face better credit terms. Our results then imply that trade credit is prefer-
able to a price cut. In other words, trade credit is the optimal policy precisely in circum-
stances in which an inventory subsidy is most relevant. A similar argument applies to
prepayment.
EVIDENCE AND SCOPE
Let us now comment on the applicability and limitations of our approach. A more de-
tailed discussion of evidence on trade credit and pricing, trade credit terms and implica-
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tions for inventory is deferred till section 7.
As noted above, our theory of trade credit best fits industries where competition is not se-
vere so that the upstream firm’s margin is not low. This could arise because the upstream
firm provides an input that is not a standardized good, or a longstanding relationship
between upstream and downstream firms imply a significant cost of switching suppliers.
Indeed, as Petersen and Rajan (1997) report, trade credit provision is positively related to
gross margin/sales. Next, trade credit is often part of a longstanding relationship.7 Fur-
ther, Burkart et al. (2008) find that “suppliers of differentiated goods and services have
larger accounts receivable than suppliers of standardized goods.” They conclude that,
overall, evidence lends most support to theories maintaining that input suppliers cannot
be easily substituted. Our theory, which relies on a positive supplier margin, fits this
category.
As for the nature of inputs, our theory clearly suits industries in which physical inputs are
used, such as manufacturing industries. For inputs that are services rather than physical
goods, our model applies so long as it takes time to produce the input service after the
order is placed. In that case, exactly as for physical inputs, if the downstream firm waits
for a customer to arrive before putting in an order for inputs, the sale is missed with
positive probability.
This naturally raises the question whether the theory can be meaningfully applied to
goods and services that are tailored to customer needs and therefore intrinsically pro-
duced to order. Clearly, the incentive for waiting to produce cannot serve as basis for
a theory, since such waiting is now automatic. However, while the effect captured in
our simple model is ruled out, effects that are very similar in spirit can arise even under
production-to-order in a richer model. Suppose the downstream firm can produce the
tailored good faster if it holds a unit of input in its inventory rather than orders and re-
ceives the unit from the upstream firm. “Immediate production” in this case means that
the downstream firm buys a unit of input and waits for a customer, while “wait-and-see”
translates to the situation in which the firm submits an order for input only when a buyer
arrives. Suppose all buyers are happy to proceed with their order in the first case, while
a fraction 1− q find the waiting time too long in the second case and withdraw their or-
7For example, Uchida, Udell andWatanabe (2006) find, for Japan, that longer relationships are associated
with more trade credit. They also report an average relationship length of 29 years between downstream
firms and their main suppliers.
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ders. Clearly, the same incentives to wait as in our model arise here - and trade credit
arises similarly as a solution.
Our theory also gives rise to comparisons between cases in which trade credit or prepay-
ment is used, suggesting that trade credit (prepayment) is more likely to occur when the
upstream margin is high (low) relative to the downstreammargin. This is consistent with
the finding by Burkart et al. (2008) that suppliers are more likely to deny trade credit to
more profitable firms, which are also less likely to be offered trade credit. This also seems
consistent with the observation (see footnote 4) that prepayment is made in industries
such as construction, shipbuilding and aircraft production, where the downstream mark-
up is likely to be significant. However, we are unaware of any detailed empirical study
of prepayment, and proper verification of such claims must await further investigation of
empirical regularities.
Finally, our theory suggests that trade credit is preferable to price cuts so long as the up-
stream firm faces credit terms that are better or at least not much worse than the down-
stream firm. If the former faces much worse terms relative to the latter and effective price
cuts are available, our explanation for choosing trade credit over price cuts is less com-
pelling. In such cases, other explanations–such as the joint credit expansion theory of
Burkart and Ellingsen (2004)–are required.
RELATED LITERATURE
We discussed above the literature explaining trade credit as a solution to asymmetric in-
formation problems. Other papers have highlighted sales as motivation for trade credit.8
A further theory (Schwartz and Whitcomb (1979), Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner
(1988)) assumes that direct price discrimination is not possible, and explains trade credit
as a device to enable this. If the seller does not have full information about its clients and
must set up a menu of contracts, incentive compatibility requires the trade credit interest
rate to be at least as high as the bank rate (see Brennan et al.). However, most trade credit
8An early contribution by Nadiri (1969) derives optimal trade credit by assuming that total sales is
an increasing function of upstream credit provision. Further, Ferris (1981) suggests that firms facing a
random input flow can reduce the transactions cost of holding liquid balances by using trade credit which
allows payments at regular intervals. In this theory, trade credit and prepayment are identical. This is also
vulnerable to the Burkart-Ellingsen critique, since any random costs (of production and/or transport) faced
by the upstream firm should come under the scope of trade credit.
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is provided at zero interest, which is lower than the bank rate. Further, this theory ties
trade credit offers to characteristics of demand facing downstream firms, and cannot ac-
count for the observed invariance of the interest charge to market demand fluctuations.
Our model accounts for these features, and also does not rely on ruling out price variation
exogenously.9
Bougheas, Mateut and Mizen (2009) study a “storage-cost” model of trade credit. An
upstream firm in a competitive industry faces a random demand for inputs from several
downstream firms. If it carries some units in inventory, it does not miss cash sales. On
the other hand, it has a storage cost of holding inventory, and if demand is low it wants
to reduce storage cost by giving some units as trade credit to downstream firms. This
is very different from our theory in which final demand is stochastic and trade credit
arises as a solution to the downstream firm’s incentive to delay production. Further, the
upstream firm in Bougheas etal. belongs to a competitive industry, while our model fits
situations in which the upstream firm has market power. Despite the difference in focus,
our model is consistent with the main evidence they uncover from data on UK firms:
upstream inventory holding to sales ratio has a negative effect on accounts receivable to
sales ratio (trade credit reduces the former and raises the latter).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 set up the model and clarify
the negative externality. Sections 4 to 6 explain how trade credit and price discounts can
solve the problem, and compares the policies. Section 7 discusses evidence. Section 8
analyzes prepayment, section 9 discusses the relative likelihood of cases under which
trade credit (prepayment) or price variation is optimal, and section 10 concludes. Proofs
not in the body of the paper are collected in appendix A, and appendix B outlines a formal
argument to show why the firm with the larger margin is likely to face a lower cost of
credit.
9Vertical integration offers a different kind of solution to these problems, and could eliminate the ex-
ternality pointed out here (as well as many of the problems identified in the literature). However, vertical
integration involves greater governance costs as well as several types of internal organization costs (see
Joskow (2005) for a succinct discussion) and is not necessarily feasible or optimal. We take it as given
that the firms are managed separately. Further, banks that have longstanding relationships with clients
might be able to vary credit terms over time to ameliorate the externality. We do not consider relationship
lending here. Indeed, Burkart et al. (2008) note the empirical regularity that firms receiving trade credit
secure financing from relatively uninformed banks: they borrow from numerous banks, and have shorter
relationships with banks.
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2 THE MODEL
An upstream firm produces an intermediate good which a downstream firm uses as in-
put, and converts into a final consumption good. There are an infinite number of periods.
Production of 1 unit by either firm takes exactly 1 period. The downstream firm has the
capacity to hold 1 unit of final good in inventory. Timing is important since–given posi-
tive interest rates–a longer inventory holding period implies a higher (opportunity) cost.
The structure of timing is as follows.
Period -1 is the set-up period for the upstream firm. At the start of period -1, the down-
stream firm can place an order for a unit of input. The upstream firm has the option
of producing 1 unit in period -110. Period 0, which follows, is the set-up period for the
downstream firm. It can buy the unit of input from the upstream firm (if the latter has a
unit available) and produce a unit of the final good, or choose to wait.
From period 1 onwards, the market is open. At the start of each period, a new customer
(who buys a unit of the final good from the downstream firm) arrives with probability p,
where 0 < p < 1.
The arrival of a new customer in any period t ≥ 1 leads to a successful sale if the down-
stream firm has a unit available in finished goods inventory. If the firm has no inventory
(this can happen, for example, if the downstream firm chooses to wait in period 0 and
a customer arrives at the start of period 1), and the customer fails to obtain a unit, he
returns with probability q next period (where 0 < q < 1), and if still not served, does not
return.
The return probability q plays an important role. If q = 0, firms either produce imme-
diately after each sale, or never produce. If q > 0, this gives firms a potential reason
for waiting till a customer arrives to start production. As we clarify later, if either non-
production or waiting to produce is optimal for a firm, a negative externality arises.
Let P denote the price of the final good and C denote the input price, which is also the
(constant) marginal cost of the downstream firm. Let G denote the (constant) marginal
cost of the upstream firm. P and G are given exogenously and satisfy P > G. The input
10Note that this period cannot be moved. In other words there is no sense in saying “the upstream firm
should start production in a period later than -1.” Whenever the upstream firm produces the first unit, that
is period -1.
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price C ∈ [G, P] is determined endogenously.
As noted in the introduction, our theory fits a scenario in which the input suppliers sell
differentiated goods and often have long term relationships with downstream firms. Re-
placing a seller might then involve incurring additional costs. Therefore, the effective
“outside option” for a downstream firm (the price at which it would decide to change
suppliers) is the price charged by a rival firm plus possibly amark-up to reflect the switch-
ing costs. Let C denote this outside option cost.
Finally, let δu and δd denote the upstream and downstream discount factor respectively.
If rk is the rate of interest charged by banks to firm k, then δk =
1
(1+rk)
, where 0 < δk ≤ 1,
and k ∈ {u, d}. Later, in section 6, we consider reasons for and impact of any divergence
between δu and δd.
PRODUCTION STRATEGIES
We consider two types of production strategies for each firm. A firm can produce imme-
diately after a sale, or follow a waiting strategy. The details are as follows.
Downstream firm: The “immediate production” strategy is as follows.
• Place an order for a unit of input at the beginning of period -1. Subsequently, pro-
duce 1 unit in period 0.
• In any period t > 0, if a customer arrives at start of the period, sell and produce
again. Otherwise carry over inventory to the next period.
A downstream firm following this strategy produces a unit initially and then immediately
after every sale, ensuring that it always has a unit of final good in inventory. The “wait-
and-see” strategy is as follows.
• Do not place an order for a unit of input at the beginning of period -1. Do nothing
in period 0.
• In any period t > 0,
– produce only if a new customer arrives at the start of period t and this customer
is not served (i.e. produce in period t > 0 only when there is a strictly positive
probability of a returning customer arriving at the start of period t + 1).
– otherwise restart period 0 strategy.
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This strategy says “produce if and only if (1) a customer arrives and (2) there is no unit in
the inventory.” If these two conditions are met, production starts. Note that the customer
who arrives is not served in this period and might return next period. The unit that is
produced is therefore sold with a higher probability next period because the probability
of at least one customer arriving next period is higher. Note also that waiting beyond
this does not make any sense, as any unsatisfied customer today is, by construction, not
around two periods from now.
Upstream firm: The immediate production strategy for the upstream firm is to produce
1 unit in period -1, and then produce 1 unit after every sale of a unit to the downstream
firm. The wait-and-see strategy for the upstream firm is simply to produce only after
an order has been received from the downstream firm. If the downstream firm follows
the immediate production strategy, it places an order (and therefore the upstream firm
produces) in period -1, and then after each sale of a final good.
Note that if both firms follow a wait-and-see strategy, production never gets started, and
payoffs are zero for all.11 Thus there are three non-trivial cases: the case in which both
firms produce immediately, and two cases in which one of the two firms wait and the
other produces immediately. In all these cases, the upstream firm produces in period
-1. Thus for purposes of comparison across cases, we can ignore the cost of production
in period -1 and simply suppose that the upstream firm starts life in period 0 with an
endowment of 1 unit of output.
BENCHMARK EFFICIENCY
It is efficient to produce both the input and the final good immediately if the total surplus
from immediate production is positive and also exceeds the surplus from following the
wait-and-see strategy in producing either the input and/or the final good.
The parameters of the model are P,G, p, q, δu and δd where δk = 1/(1+ rk), for k ∈ {u, d}.
Let rm ≡ max{ru, rd}. As we show formally in appendix A.16, a sufficient condition for
immediate production of both input and output to be efficient is that the expected rate of
surplus from a sale exceeds the (highest) interest rate:
p
(P− G)
G
> rm. (2.1)
11Even if a customer arrives at the start of period 1, ordering the input serves no purpose since it would
take two periods to produce the input and then the final good, implying that the customer could not be
served.
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We assume this holds. Therefore the benchmark requires immediate production by both
upstream and downstream firms.
Finally, a word on notation. The net present value payoff of a firm under any strategy is a
function of the parameters P,G, p, q, δu, δd as well as the input price C. For most parts, we
can suppress these arguments without loss of clarity. However, in sections 5 and 6, we
explicitly vary the input price, and then it is clearer to write payoffs with the argument C
made explicit.
3 OPTIMAL STRATEGIES AND EXTERNALITY
3.1 DOWNSTREAM OPTIMUM
Recall from section 2 that the outside option input cost for the downstream firm is de-
noted by C. Therefore if the upstream firm is simply selling inputs to the downstream
firm it must charge a price C 6 min{P,C}. In this section we analyze the subgame after
such an input price has been chosen. In other words, given any choice of C satisfying the
above inequality, we analyze the optimal downstream strategy under different parameter
configurations. Then in the next section we analyze the optimal upstream policy.
First, we need to consider the incentive of the downstream firm to participate in produc-
tion at all. Clearly, if the rate of interest is high relative to the return from investment,
the optimal choice is to not invest. Given any C, rate of return from investment for the
downstream firm is given by p(P− C)/C. Since p ∈ [0, 1], the best possible rate of return
is (P− C)/C. The following result shows that if this rate is lower than the interest rate rd
(implying the condition δd > C/P), the downstream firm optimally chooses not to invest.
Proposition 1 If δd ≤ C/P, the optimal strategy of the downstream firm is not to invest.
Next, let V I0 be the value at time 0 under immediate production. In this case, the down-
stream firm incurs cost C initially to produce a unit. In each subsequent period, with
probability p a sale is made and another unit is produced, implying that expected payoff
in each period is p(P− C). It follows that:
V I0 = − C + δd p (P− C) + δ
2
d p (P− C) + . . . = − C +
δd p (P− C)
1− δd
. (3.1)
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Finally, let VW0 be the payoff under the wait-and-see strategy. This can be derived as
follows. Under this strategy, no production or sale happens in period 0 so that the payoff
in that period is 0. The payoff starting period 1 depends on whether a customer arrives
at the start of period 1 (which happens with probability p) or not. If not, the situation
in period 1 is exactly as in period 0, and the value starting period 1 is simply VW0 . If a
customer does arrive at the start of period 1, let V1(1) denote the value starting period 1.
We then have
VW0 = 0+ δd
(
(1− p) VW0 + p V1(1)
)
. (3.2)
To calculate V1(1), note that once a customer arrives at the start of period 1, the down-
stream firm produces a unit in period 1 incurring cost C. Following this, at the beginning
of period 2, there are 3 possible states: exactly 1 customer arrives; 2 customers (1 old and
1 new) arrive; and no one arrives. It is easy to calculate the payoff for each state, and
the overall expected payoff EV2. V1(1) is then given by (−C + δd EV2). Using this value
in (3.2), we calculate the following expression for VW0 . The detailed derivation is in the
appendix.
Lemma 1 The payoff of the downstream firm under the wait-and-see strategy is given by
VW0 =
δd p [δdP (p + (1− δd)(1− p)q) − C (1− δd(1− p))]
(1− δd)(1− δd + δdp(2− q))
. (3.3)
Proposition 1 above shows the optimal choice for the case δdP 6 C. The following result
now derives the optimal strategy in the complementary case, shown in figure 1 (in sec-
tion 4). Let pD
ℓ
denote the cutoff below which the downstream firm does not produce,
and let pDic denote the cutoff above which it follows the immediate production strategy.
Proposition 2 For δdP > C, there exist cutoffs p
D
ℓ
and pDic where 0 ≤ p
D
ℓ
< pDic < 1 such
that (a) for any p ≥ pDic , the optimal choice is immediate production, (b) for p
D
ℓ
< p < pDic ,
wait-and-see is optimal, and (c) for p ≤ pD
ℓ
no investment is optimal. pD
ℓ
and pDic are given by:
pDℓ = max
{
0,
(1− δd)(C − δd q P)
δd((P− C)− (1− δd) q P)
}
, (3.4)
pDic =
(1− δd)C
δd((P− C)− q (δd P− C))
. (3.5)
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Note that the parameter q is crucial in distinguishingwaiting from non-investment. Clearly,
if q = 0, pD
ℓ
= pDic , and the choice is simply between immediate production and non-
investment since the probability of a sale cannot now be increased by delaying production
till a customer arrives.
3.2 UPSTREAM PAYOFFS AND EXTERNALITY
Just as δdP > C is necessary for downstream investment to take place (proposition 1), a
necessary condition for upstream investment to be viable is δuC > G. We assume this
holds. We also assume, for the analysis in this section, that the upstream firm always
produces immediately after a sale. This is true if G is low relative to C.12 The case in
which upstream firm waits is analyzed in section 8.
Let U I0 and U
W
0 denote the payoffs of the upstream firm when the downstream firm
chooses the strategy of immediate production and wait-and-see, respectively.
Lemma 2
U I0 = (C− G) +
δu p (C− G)
1− δu
, (3.6)
UW0 =
δup
(1− δu) + δu p (2− q)
U I0. (3.7)
We have assumed that δuC > G, which implies C − G > 0, and therefore U
I
0 > 0. Note
that the coefficient of U I0 on the right hand side of equation (3.7) is strictly lower than
1. Therefore U I0 > U
W
0 > 0, i.e. the upstream firm would want the downstream firm to
invest and follow the immediate production strategy for all p > 0. Thus the downstream
firm generates a negative externality if it either decides to wait and see (pD
ℓ
6 p < pDic))
or not to invest at all (p < pD
ℓ
).
12The upstream payoff from waiting is derived formally in Lemma 3 in section 8. The result shows that
immediate production is better for the upstream firm than waiting whenever C is high and/or G is low. By
waiting, the upstream firm saves interest cost on G, but since waiting forces the downstream firm to wait
as well, some sales are lost with positive probability. Clearly, therefore, immediate production is better if C
is high relative to G.
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4 DELAYED PAYMENT
Trade credit is an offer to delay the payment for a fraction τ ∈ [0, 1] of the cost of inputs
till the next order13 - which occurs when a customer arrives next and a sale takes place.
In the analysis belowwe fix the input price C and work out the optimal trade credit given
this price. Later, in section 6, we analyze the overall optimal policy by allowing both price
variation and trade credit.
4.1 OPTIMAL TRADE CREDIT
Without any trade credit, the payoff of the downstream firm from immediate production
is given by equation (3.1): V I0 = − C +
δd p (P−C)
1−δd
. Suppose trade credit of τ C, where
τ ∈ [0, 1], is offered, and assume that the trade credit offer is such that the downstream
firm chooses to produce immediately. Then the downstream firm pays (1− τ)C to the
upstream firm on delivery of each unit of the input good it purchases. Thus the first
period payoff is − (1− τ)C. In each subsequent period, if there is a sale made by the
downstream firm, it receives the price P, repays τ C, and incurs a new cost of production
of (1− τ)C. Thus in each period after period 1, the payoff is the same as before, and
given by p (P− C). Thus the payoff under trade credit, denoted by VT0 , is given by
VT0 = − (1− τ)C +
δd p (P− C)
1− δd
= V I0 + τ C. (4.1)
This proves the following result, which is very useful for later calculations.
Proposition 3 Suppose the input price is C, and for each unit of input sold, trade credit is offered
for a fraction τ ∈ [0, 1] of the input cost. Suppose also that τ is such that the downstream
incentive to produce immediately is satisfied. Then the trade credit scheme can be represented by a
total transfer of τ C from the upstream to the downstream firm.
A trade credit offer is feasible if it satisfies downstream incentive to produce immediately,
as well as the upstream participation constraint. Using equation (4.1), the downstream
incentive constraint is given by VT0 = V
I
0 + τ C ≥ max{0,V
W
0 }. Next, let U
T
0 denote the
upstream payoff under trade credit. We need UT0 ≥ max{0,U
W
0 }. Using the proposition
13We implicitly assume that the trade credit interest rate is zero. Later, in section 6.3 we show that this is
without loss of generality.
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above, UT0 = U
I
0 − τ C. Further, from (3.7), U
W
0 > 0. Thus the upstream participation
constraint simplifies to U I0 − τ C ≥ U
W
0 .
Without trade credit, the downstream firm invests and follows the immediate production
strategy for p ≥ pDic , and for p < p
D
ic there is a loss of efficiency. The following result
shows that the optimal trade credit offer τ∗C restores efficiency for p < pDic whenever
the upstream participation-in-trade-credit constraint holds. Full efficiency is achieved if
G = 0.
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Figure 1: The upstream participation-in-trade-credit constraint is satisfied for p ≥ pUptc.
Here, for δu = 0.85, pUptc = 0.2. For all values of δd for which pDic > 0.2 (the shaded region),
trade credit can restore first best on [0.2, pDic ). The figure is drawn here for C/P = 0.6,
q = 0.6 and G = 0.1.
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Proposition 4 The optimal trade credit fraction τ∗ ∈ [0, 1] is given by
τ∗ =
1
C
(
max{0,VW0 ,V
I
0 } −V
I
0
)
.
Further, there exists a cutoff pUptc > 0 which is such that the upstream participation-in-trade-
credit constraint holds whenever p > pUptc, implying that efficiency is restored for any p such that
pUptc 6 p < pDic . The cutoff pUptc is increasing in G and decreasing in δu, and goes to 0 as either
G → 0 or δu → 1.
The result shows that if either G is low or δu is high, the interval [pUptc, p
D
ic ) is well defined
and trade credit restores efficiency on this interval.14 The efficiency gain under trade
credit is illustrated in figure 1.
5 DISCOUNTED INPUT PRICE
Let us now show that a price-based policy can also solve the externality problem. The
intuition is straightforward: a price cut encourages immediate production by reducing
the cost of obtaining inputs, thereby subsidizing inventory costs.
For this section and the next, it is convenient to change notation slightly andwrite payoffs
with the argument C made explicit.
Recall that any contract between the up and downstream firms must give the latter a
payoff that is at least as high as that resulting from either not investing or investing and
buying inputs at a cost C (the input price charged by a rival supplier plus a mark-up
reflecting switching costs). Suppose the upstream firm offers a (discounted) price CD to a
downstream firm if the latter produces immediately after a sale and a price C if it pursues
a wait-and-see strategy.15 Since V I0 (CD) is decreasing in CD, there exists CD 6 min{P,C}
such that immediate production under a price CD is more attractive to the downstream
firm compared to any other strategy.
14Note also that the parameter q has an ambiguous effect on trade credit. On the one hand, an increase in
q increases the incentive to wait (it raisesVW0 ), but it also lowers the loss fromwaiting (raisesU
W
0 ), lowering
the incentive to provide trade credit.
15If C 6 P, offering any C < C in this case only encourages the downstream firm not to produce imme-
diately. If C > P, then any price in the interval [P,C] has the same incentive: the downstream firm would
prefer not to produce at these prices, and CD simply needs to ensure participation in production.
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The optimal choice of CD, denoted by C
∗
D, is given by V
I
0 (C
∗
D) = max
{
0,VW0 (C),V
I
0 (C)
}
,
i.e.
− C∗D +
δdp(P− C
∗
D)
1− δd
= max
{
0,VW0 (C),V
I
0 (C)
}
. (5.1)
Finally, we need to check that the upstream participation constraint holds. The result
below shows when this is achieved.16
Proposition 5 For any C 6 C such that max{VW0 (C), 0} > V I0 (C), there exists C∗D < C such
that V I0 (C
∗
D) = max{V
W
0 (C), 0}. Further, for δd > δu, there exists a cutoff pUpdp ∈ (0, 1) which is
such that the upstream participation-in-discounted-price constraint holds for p > pUpdp implying
that efficiency is restored for p ∈ [pUpdp, p
D
ic ]. The cutoff p
U
pdp is decreasing in G and decreasing in
δd, and goes to 0 as either G → 0 or δd → 1.
6 TRADE CREDIT VERSUS PRICE VARIATION
As discussed in the introduction, our model fits a scenario of imperfect price competition
in the upstream sector with firms enjoying a degree of market power. Evidence sug-
gests that input suppliers sell differentiated products, and downstream firms are often
in longstanding relationships with particular suppliers, implying that substituting input
suppliers could be costly. The outside option C, as defined in section 2, is the outside
input price plus a mark-up reflecting such switching costs.
To compare a policy of price variation with trade credit, we need to clarify two aspects
related to the outside option. Suppose both the incumbent and rival suppliers offer the
same trade credit terms, and suppose C < P. In this case, a downstream firm would
switch to a rival supplier if the incumbent upstream firm charges a price C > C, so that
the input price is “flexible up to C.” On the other hand, if either there are no rival firms or
if the adjustment costs are high so that C > P, the outside option places no constraint on
the upstream firm’s input price C, i.e. it can be adjusted all the way up to P if necessary.
In this case, we say that the price policy is “fully flexible”.
Second, we have so far assumed C is fixed exogenously. However, it might itself respond
to price changes by the upstream firm. We say that a policy of price cuts by an upstream
16As the next section shows, a price discount is in fact optimal only when δd > δu - and so we report
results for this case only. In fact, for δd < δu, it is even more difficult to satisfy the upstream participation
constraint.
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firm is subject to “competitive pressure” if a price reduction by the firm leads to a fall
in the price charged by rival suppliers, reducing the downstream outside option. A price
policy is defined to be “fully effective” if it is not subject to competitive pressure. In other
words, a fully effective price policy allows the upstream firm to reduce prices without
affecting C.
To compare trade credit with price variation, we first assume the following. We relax this
later and show how the conclusions change.
Assumption 1 The upstream price policy is fully effective and fully flexible.
We now show that trade credit and price variation lead to different outcomes when the
costs of outside funds facing the upstream and downstream firms are different. Specif-
ically, whenever the upstream firm faces a lower cost of funds, trade credit is optimal,
while a price discount is optimal if the downstream firm faces better terms. The intuition
is as follows.
A dollar of trade credit represents a transfer of the interest costs of $1 from upstream
to downstream. But a reduction of $1 in the input price is like a loan for which neither
interest costs nor the principal amount are paid back. Therefore if the upstream firm
is indifferent between $1 of trade credit and $x of price cut, it must be that x < 1. It
follows that for the downstream firm, trade credit reduces current interest costs on a
higher amount (1 rather than x), effectively injecting more immediate cash, while a price
cut requires less to be paid back (0 rather than 1) after a sale occurs in the future. If a
downstream firm is cash-strapped and more impatient than the upstream firm, it prefers
to receive trade credit, while a downstream firm with relatively greater patience prefers a
price cut.
There are several reasons why the upstream and downstream firms might face different
credit terms from outside lenders such as banks. We outline a formal argument in ap-
pendix B along the following lines. An upstream firm has a natural advantage over a
bank in observing sales whenever sales are followed immediately by an input order.17
17Under trade credit, the downstream firm places an order immediately after each sale, making sales
observable to the input supplier. Thus the input supplier is the natural candidate to offer trade credit. In
other words, the upstream firm’s advantage over a bank in observing sales derives simply from the fact
that it is the input supplier.
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Suppose outside lenders such as banks cannot observe each sale, and therefore lend over
a fixed duration. Also suppose the upstream firm has greater market power and earns a
higher mark-up per unit compared to the downstream firm (i.e. C− G high, P− C low).
Repayment of any loan from a bank depends on achieving a certain number of sales for
each firm. Given the mark-ups, this number is clearly greater for the downstream firm.
When p falls, the ability of the downstream firm to make a timely repayment is affected
more than that of the upstream firm, implying that lenders face a greater risk in lending
to the former and charge a higher rate.
6.1 OPTIMAL TRADE CREDIT AND PRICE POLICY
To clarify the choice between the policies, let us first compare the total surplus under
trade credit and price discounting for any given input price C. Suppose at this price the
downstream firm does not have an incentive to produce immediately, but it is possible to
restore the incentive with either a discounted price CD < C or trade credit τ. The total
surplus under trade credit is ST(C) ≡ V I0 (C) + τC +U
I
0(C)− τC = V
I
0 (C) +U
I
0(C). The
total surplus under a price discount is SD(CD) ≡ V
I
0 (CD) +U
I
0(CD). It follows that
ST(C)− SD(CD) = p
(
δu − δd
(1− δu)(1− δd)
)
(C− CD) . (6.1)
Thus ST(C) R SD(CD) as δu R δd.
Next, we assume that the upstream firm sets the input price subject to satisfying the
downstream participation constraint and characterize the overall optimal policy. Note
that either policy is optimal if δu = δd.
Proposition 6 Suppose assumption 1 holds, and supposemax{0,VW0 (C)} > V
I
0 (C). The opti-
mal policy is given by the following:
• If δu > δd, the optimal policy is τ = 1 and C = C
∗, where
δdp(P− C
∗)
1− δd
= max{0,VW0 (C)}. (6.2)
• If δu < δd, the optimal policy is τ = 0 and C = C
∗
D where C
∗
D is given by equation (5.1).
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Thus if the upstream firm faces better credit terms (δu > δd), the optimal policy is to
offer full trade credit (i.e. advance the input and defer the entire payment) and have the
highest possible input price that satisfies the downstream participation constraint. On the
other hand, if δu < δd, the optimal policy is purely price-based, and requires lowering the
input price to the level that just makes it incentive compatible for the downstream firm to
pursue the immediate production strategy.
6.2 RELAXING THE ASSUMPTION OF FULLY EFFECTIVE AND FULLY FLEXIBLE PRICING
Let us now relax assumption 1 and show how this affects the result above.
Relaxing fully effective pricing If the upstream firm is subject to competitive pressure
so that a price cut leads to a fall in the outside option price of the downstream firm (so
that pricing is not fully effective), the efficacy of the price instrument is reduced. The
effectiveness of trade credit, on the other hand, does not depend upon the behavior of
competing firms. A firm receiving trade credit has the incentive to produce immediately
irrespective of offers by competing input sellers. This leads to the following result which
shows that trade credit can be optimal even for some cases in which the upstream firm
faces worse credit terms compared to the downstream firm (i.e. for a range of values of δu
below δd).
Corollary 1 If C is an increasing function of C (so that pricing is not fully effective), there exists
δ∗ < δd such that for any δu > δ∗ the optimal policy is to set τ = 1 and set C to satisfy the
downstream participation constraint given by (6.2).
Relaxing fully flexible pricing Further, if C < P so that the input price is only flexible
up to C, we get the following result. As discussed in section 7, this provides an explana-
tion for the fact that larger clients are offered trade credit as well as a lower price.
Corollary 2 If C < P, trade credit must be offered along with a price less than or equal to C.
6.3 TRADE CREDIT INTEREST RATE
We have assumed a zero trade credit interest rate throughout. Intuitively, this is without
loss of generality because in ourmodel trade credit serves as a subsidy. Adding an interest
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rate simply reduces the subsidy. But if it makes sense to offer the subsidy in the first
place, adding interest serves no purpose. We verify this formally below. Suppose a rate
of interest rt is charged for delayed payment. The following result shows that we can set
rt = 0 in all cases without loss of generality. The proof is relegated to the appendix.
Corollary 3 Whenever it is optimal for the upstream firm to offer full trade credit (τ = 1), its
payoff is independent of rt and in other cases it is optimal to set rt = 0.
7 RELATING TO EVIDENCE
Trade Credit and Firm Margin, Profit and Sales: Petersen and Rajan (1997) find that
trade credit provision increases in the supplier’s margin. At the same time, firms that
experience a decline in sales, as well as firms that have lower net income (lower cash flow)
offer more trade credit. Further, Burkart et al. (2008) find that suppliers are more likely
to deny trade credit to more profitable firms, which are also less likely to be offered trade
credit. While these might appear anomalous (Petersen and Rajan do say their finding is
surprising), these are precisely the predictions of our model.
As the margin C− G rises, the upstream firm has more to lose from lost sales, and there-
fore has more of an incentive to provide an inventory subsidy. On the other hand, the
parameter p captures the volatility of final good sales (and therefore also of input sales).
When p is high, the level of sales is high and the downstream firm has no incentive to
wait, eliminating the need for trade credit. This explains why trade credit provision in-
creases in the supplier’s margin and at the same time firms suffering sales declines and
lower cash-flow offer more trade credit. Further, considering the firms that receive trade
credit, as the downstream firm’s margin (P− C) rises, and/or sales are high (high p), it
has less incentive to wait, reducing the need for trade credit.
Trade Credit and Input Pricing: Our theory suggests that along with trade credit, price
is raised to the highest level consistent with downstream participation constraint. How-
ever, corollary 2 in section 6.2 shows that if the outside option C < P, prices are not fully
flexible, and trade credit must be combined with a price of at most C.
In other words, given that the competition environment is a confounding factor, testing this
aspect of the theory is difficult. Burkart et al. (2008) report that larger firms with many
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suppliers are offered more trade credit and lower prices. As discussed above, our theory
is not inconsistent with this evidence.18
Trade Credit Terms and Relation with the Rate of Interest: As explained above, our
model is consistent with a trade credit interest rate (of zero) which is below a positive
bank rate. Further, in the model the duration of trade credit is naturally bounded by
purchase of input at one end and sale of final good at the other, implying that the model
is consistent with the observation that trade credit is usually short term credit.
Next, the decision to offer trade credit depends crucially on the bank interest rates as well
as market demand. A high bank rate and/or low p create incentives to move away from
immediate production, generating a scope for trade credit. But when offered, the zero rate
charged does not respond to bank rate changes, or changes in market demand. This is
consistent with the observed insensitivity of the trade credit interest rate to changes in
the bank rate.
The relation between bank rates and trade credit is summarized in Figure 1. Suppose the
bank rate increases so that ru and rd rise - i.e. δu and δd fall. This raises the incentive to
wait (or even to not invest), creating greater scope for trade credit. On the other hand,
this reduces upstream incentive to provide trade credit, and large enough rise in the rate
would violate the upstream participation constraint. A similar effect arises from lower-
ing p. Indeed, if the economic situation is such that a large rise in the bank rate is also
accompanied by a fall in p, the same effect (scope for trade credit higher, but harder to
satisfy the upstream participation constraint) is strengthened.
Inventory Investment: In their paper on inventories, Blinder and Maccini (1991) point
out that “the question of why inventory investment seems to be insensitive to changes in
real interest rates remains open, important, and troublesome.” In our model, trade credit
18However, if generally firms receiving trade credit (irrespective of the competition environment) have
lower cost of input, this would not be a good explanation. An alternative explanation in the case of firms
with multiple suppliers – which is not captured by our simple model, but not inconsistent with it – is as
follows. With many suppliers, a sale is not automatically followed by an order, which means any given
supplier may not be sure when a sale takes place - i.e. when the usefulness of its trade credit expires (and
then potentially starts to indirectly subsidize the purchase of the next unit of input from another supplier).
In this case, to encourage early repayment, a price discount incentive may be given. This could result in a
lower cost of inputs for relatively credit unconstrained large firms. Indeed, Burkart et al. (2008) themselves
propose repayment incentive as an explanation of discounts to large firms.
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ensures that for a large range of parameter values the downstream firm adopts immediate
production, implying unit inventory per period (the firm either produces 1 unit or carries
1 unit) which is insensitive to the interest rate. Maccini, Moore and Schaller (2004) offer
an explanation to the inventory insensitivity puzzle based on the claim that firms care
about the long-run level of the interest rate and not about short run rate fluctuations.
Our theory complements their work by identifying an additional reason to suggest that
inventory investment by firms might not respond to transitory shocks, but does respond
to large and persistent changes in the real interest rate.
8 PREPAYMENT
We now proceed with the assumption that the downstream firm chooses to produce im-
mediately ((P− C) high) and analyze the upstream firm’s incentive to delay production,
making a case for prepayment.19
8.1 OPTIMAL STRATEGY OF THE UPSTREAM FIRM
Let UUI0 and U
UW
0 denote the payoffs of the upstream firm when the upstream firm
chooses the strategy of immediate production and wait-and-see, respectively.
Lemma 3 UUI0 = C − G +
δu p (C− G)
1− δu
,
UUW0 = C +
δu p(δu C− G)
(1− δu) (1+ δu p (1− δu q (1− p)))
.
We now derive the optimal strategy of the upstream firm. Recall from section 3.2 that
when the upstream firm simply sells units of input to the downstream firm at a price C,
the former chooses not to produce at all if δuC 6 G. The next result derives the optimal
choice for the complementary case.
Let pUic denote the cutoff above which the upstream incentive to follow the immediate
production strategy is satisfied.
19This paper provides an explanation for prepayment in developed market economies with little or no
chance of default. Including a default risk (perhaps because of poor enforcement of law) would obviously
increase the scope for prepayment, as this now also serves as insurance against default.
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Proposition 7 For any given C,G and δu satisfying δuC > G, there exists a unique cutoff
pUic ∈ (0, 1) such that for p ≥ p
U
ic , the optimal choice is immediate production, and for p < p
U
ic ,
wait-and-see is optimal.
8.2 DOWNSTREAM OPTIMUM
Let VUI0 and V
UW
0 denote the payoffs of the downstream firm when the upstream firm
chooses the strategy of immediate production and wait-and-see, respectively. VUI0 is the
same as V I0 given by (3.1). We derive V
UW
0 below.
Lemma 4 VUW0 = − C +
δd p
(
P− δd C
)
(1− δd) (1+ δd p (1− δd q (1− p)))
.
The following characterizes the downstream optimum.
Proposition 8 Whenever the downstream firm prefers immediate production to waiting itself,
it also prefers the upstream sector to produce immediately rather than wait and see. Formally,
VUI0 > V
UW
0 for p > pDic , where pDic is given by equation (3.5).
8.3 PREPAYMENT
Suppose prepayment is offered for a fraction θ ∈ [0, 1] of the upstream price at every in-
stance of placing an order for inputs, and θ is such that the upstream incentive to produce
immediately is restored. Then, as in the case of trade credit, the prepayment scheme can
be represented by a total transfer of θ C from the downstream firm to the upstream firm.
Since the argument is exactly similar to proposition 3, we omit the proof here.
Let pDpp denote the cutoff above which the downstream participation-in-prepayment con-
straint holds. Recall that pUic is the cutoff below which the upstream firm chooses the
wait-and-see strategy (creating a scope for prepayment) and pDic is the cutoff above which
the downstream firm chooses immediate production. The following result characterizes
the outcome under prepayment.
Proposition 9 Under condition 2.1, for any G > 0 there exists ∆ > 0 such that for C −
G 6 ∆, we have pDpp < pUic , and prepayment restores full efficiency on the non-empty inter-
val [max{pDpp, p
D
ic}, p
U
ic ].
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8.4 PREPAYMENT VERSUS INPUT PRICE MARK-UP
As under trade credit, we can compare the total surplus under prepayment (SPP(C)) to
that under a price mark-up (SM(CM)) . Suppose the upstream firm does not have an
incentive to produce immediately, but it is possible to restore the incentive with either a
price mark-up CM > C or prepayment θ. Similar to equation (6.1), S
M(CM)− S
PP(C) =
p
(
δu − δd
(1− δu)(1− δd)
)
(CM − C). Thus S
PP(C) R SM(CM) as δd R δu. Finally, it is easy to
show that if δu > δd, the optimal policy is a pure price mark-up that is sufficient to induce
immediate production, and if δu < δd, the optimal policy is to prepay the full input price,
and then set the lowest possible price consistent with upstream participation. Further,
analogously to the case of trade credit before, if prices are not fully flexible, the scope for
prepayment expands. We omit the details.
9 COMPARING ACROSS POLICIES: TRADE CREDIT, PREPAYMENT, PRICE
VARIATION
First, note that the scope for trade credit or a price discount depends on both downstream
incentive to move away from immediate production, and upstream incentive to provide
a remedial subsidy. It can be checked easily that as the downstream margin (P − C)
rises, V I0 − V
W
0 rises. Therefore the incentive to move away from immediate production
declines. Further, as the upstream margin (C − G) rises, U I0 −U
W
0 rises, raising the in-
centive to provide a remedial subsidy if needed. Similar reasoning can be applied to the
case of prepayment/price mark-up, the scope for which rises and falls in the down and
upstream margins respectively. The following statement summarizes these facts:
The scope for trade credit and/or a discounted input price increases in C − G, and decreases in
P − C, while the scope for prepayment and/or an input price mark-up decreases in C − G, and
increases in P− C.
If the upstreammargin is high relative to the downstreammargin, a scope for trade credit
and/or a price discount arises. But which policy is optimal? As discussed in section 6
(and appendix B), in this case the upstream firm is likely to face easier credit terms, which
implies that trade credit, rather than a price discount, is the optimal policy instrument.
Similarly, if (P − C) is high relative to (C − G), a scope for prepayment and/or a price
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mark-up arises. And, as section 8.4 shows, this is also a case in which the downstream
firm is likely to face easier credit terms, which makes prepayment, rather than a price
mark-up, the optimal instrument. The table below summarizes our results about the
relative likelihood of the direction of a subsidizing policy and the optimal instrument to
implement the policy.
δu > δd δu < δd
(P− C) low, (C− G) high Trade credit Price discount
(P− C) high, (C− G) low Price mark-up Prepayment
Further, as discussed before, if price cuts are not fully effective (flexible), trade credit
(prepayment) is optimal even if the upstream firm faces worse (better) terms.
10 CONCLUSION
The literature on trade credit has often emphasized that a discount term represents a
high implicit interest rate. We ask a complementary question: why is so much trade
credit supplied on net terms, charging zero interest? Indeed, even credit including a
discount period is not a simple high cost loan - it includes an interest free period. Further,
prepayment, which is reverse trade credit, is simply a cash advance provided at an exactly
zero interest rate.
In our theory, a downstream firm cuts inventories if the opportunity cost of holding in-
ventories exceeds the expected loss through foregone sales. But lost sales create an exter-
nality for the upstream firm. Given that a relatively high bank rate is one of the factors
that generate the incentive to save on inventories, bank loans cannot solve the problem.
The solution must be a loan at a subsidized rate and trade credit delivers precisely such
a subsidy. Further, the upstream firm has an incentive to provide such credit because it
benefits from increased sales when the downstream firm internalizes the externality. Sim-
ilarly, prepayment arises as a response to a reverse externality originating from upstream
cost saving. Importantly, an inventory subsidy is limited by the value of inputs. This
implies that our theory is consistent with the fact that the extent of trade credit (and pre-
payment) is determined by the value of inputs, and is therefore immune to the Burkart-
Ellingsen critique.
The theory clarifies why trade credit and prepayment are provided at zero interest, which
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is necessarily lower than the bank rate, and explains the invariance of trade credit terms
to fluctuations in the bank rate as well as market demand. Further, in our theory trade
credit is a complement - not substitute - of bank lending. The literature often implies
that such complementarity arises from credit rationing. Our theory, in contrast, predicts
complementarity even in the absence of such constraints. Finally, note that while trade
credit is a zero-interest loan, it is not necessarily cheap since the input price could be
raised simultaneously.
However, a price discount could also deliver the subsidy implicit in trade credit. There-
fore the use of trade credit requires further justification. We show that trade credit Pareto
dominates price cuts when the upstream firm faces better credit terms relative to the
downstream firm. This is likely to be the case when the former earns a higher margin
compared to the latter. But the scope for trade credit or price discounting arises pre-
cisely when the upstream firm earns a relatively higher margin. Thus the circumstance in
which the upstream firmwould like to induce the downstream firm to adopt the immedi-
ate production strategy is also naturally the case in which trade credit is preferred to price
variation. A similar analysis applies to prepayment. Finally, if price cuts are not fully ef-
fective because they are matched by rival firms, trade credit is also optimal for a range of
cases in which the upstream firm faces worse credit terms compared to the downstream
firm.
In sum, our model shows that it is plausible to take a view of inter-firm credit as an
optimal instrument delivering a targeted subsidy which covers at most the input costs
and adjusts inventory incentives to prevent lost sales.
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11 APPENDIX A: PROOFS
A.1 PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We know from (3.2) that VW0 = 0+ δd
(
(1− p) VW0 + p V1(1)
)
where V1(1) is the value
starting period 1 if a customer arrives at the start of period 1. To calculate V1(1), recall
that once a customer arrives at the start of period 1, there are 3 possible states at the
beginning of period 2: State 1: Exactly one customer arrives. Probability of this event is
(p + q− 2p q). The firm sells and gets P, and then restarts period 0 strategy. Thus payoff
is P +VW0 .
State 2: 2 customers (1 old and 1 new) arrive. Probability of this event is p q. The firm
sells to the returning customer and gets P, and then onwards gets V1(1). Thus payoff is
P +V1(1).
State 3: No one arrives. Probability of this event is (1− p)(1− q). Let the payoff in this
state be denoted by V2(0). This is given by:
V2(0) = 0+ δd
(
p (P +VW0 ) + (1− p) V2(0)
)
. (A.1)
From the above,
V1(1) = − C + δd
[
(p + q− 2p q)(P +VW0 ) + p q(P +V1(1)) + (1− p)(1− q)V2(0)
]
.
Using this as well as equations (3.2) and (A.1), we can solve for VW0 and obtain the stated
value.‖
A.2 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
From equation (3.3), we can write VW0 as V
W
0 = f (δd)g(δd), where f (δd) =
δdp
1− δd
, and
g(δd) =
P(p + (1− δd) q (1− p))− C/δd + C (1− p)
D
,
where D = (1− δd)/δd + p(2− q).
g(C/P) = −
C (P−C) (1−p) (1−q)
(P−C)+p (2−q) C
≤ 0, with strict inequality for p < 1. Thus at δd = C/P,
VW0 ≤ 0, with strict inequality for p < 1. Further, at δd = C/P, V
I
0 = −C(1− p) ≤ 0.
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Now, f (·) > 0, f ′(·) > 0. Further,
g′(·) =
1
δ2dD
2
(
p(1− δ2dq (2− q) (1− p))P + (1− δd)
2q (1− p) P+ p (1− q) C
)
> 0,
where the last step follows from the fact that the maximized value of q(2− q) is 1, and
therefore 1 − δ2dq(2 − q)(1 − p) > 0. Thus
∂VW0
∂δd
> 0 whenever g(δd) > 0. But since
f (δd) > 0 always, whenever g(δd) > 0 it is also true that V
W
0 > 0.
Therefore, if g(δ̂d) > 0 for any δ̂d > 0, then g(·) is positive and increasing for all δd > δ̂d.
Since for δd = C/P, both V
I
0 andV
W
0 are non-positive, from the above it follows that for all
δd < C/P they are negative. Thus for any investment to take place, a necessary condition
is δd > C/P.‖
A.3 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
From equation (3.3), VW0 ≥ 0 implies
p ≥
(1− δd)(C − δdqP)
δd((P− C)− (1− δd)qP)
, (A.2)
where strict equality implies VW0 = 0. From equation (3.1), V
I
0 ≥ 0 implies
p ≥
(1− δd)C
δd(P− C)
, (A.3)
where, similarly, strict equality implies V I0 = 0. It can be easily checked that for any
δd ∈ (C/P, 1), the expression on the right hand side of (A.3) strictly exceeds that of (A.2).
Thus the participation constraint for investment is given by p ≥ pD
ℓ
where pD
ℓ
is the
maximum of 0 and the expression on the right hand side of (A.2).
Next, the optimal choice is immediate production if V I0 ≥ V
W
0 . Solving from equa-
tions (3.1) and (3.3), this is the case if p ≥ pDic where p
D
ic is as in equation (3.5).
Finally, we check that pD
ℓ
< pDic < 1. p
D
ic < 1 is true if
(1−δd)C
δd((P−C)−q(δdP−C))
< 1, which
simplifies to δdq < 1, which is true.
Next, since (P− C)− q(δdP− C) > (P− C)− (δdP− C) = (1− δd) P > 0, it is clear that
pDic > 0. Thus p
D
ℓ
< pDic is true if
(1− δd)(C − δdqP)
δd((P− C)− (1− δd)qP)
<
(1− δd)C
δd((P− C)− q(δdP− C))
,
29
which implies (δdP− C)(P(1− δdq) + C) > 0, which is true, since δd > C/P.
Thus for p ≥ pDic , immediate production is optimal, for p ∈ (p
D
ℓ
, pDic ), the payoff from
waiting is higher than immediate production (VW0 > V
I
0 ), and satisfies the participation
constraint (VW0 > 0). Finally, for p ≤ p
D
ℓ
, the payoff from investment is negative, and not
investing is optimal.‖
A.4 PROOF OF LEMMA 2
If the downstream firm adopts the immediate production strategy, in each period a sale
is made with probability p. This also means that in each period the upstream firm makes
a sale to the downstream firm with probability p. In this case, the upstream payoff is as
follows. As noted at the end of section 2, without loss of generality we can ignore the cost
in period -1 (in effect assuming that the upstream firm starts with a unit of endowment
in period 0). In period 0, the upstream firm sells this endowment and then produces
another unit, making the period payoff C − G. Similarly, in any period t > 0, a unit is
produced if a sale is made to the downstream firm (which happens if the downstream
firms sells a unit) so that the expected payoff is p (C − G) in each such period. Thus
U I0 = (C− G) + δu p (C− G) + . . ., which explains equation (3.6).
If the downstream firm adopts the wait-and-see strategy, the payoff of the upstream firm
can be calculated as follows. In what follows, the term “customer” means a customer for
the downstream firm, i.e. a final customer.
Let U1(1) be the value starting period 1 if a customer arrives at the start of period 1, and
U1(0) be the value starting period 1 if no one arrives at the start of period 1. In the latter
case, the situation is exactly as at the start of period 0 and thus U1(0) = U
W
0 . Then
UW0 = 0+ δu
(
(1− p) UW0 + p U1(1)
)
. (A.4)
To calculateU1(1), note that once a customer arrives at the start of period 1, the upstream
firm sells a unit and earns C− G in period 1. Following this, at the beginning of period
2, there are 3 possible states (exactly as in the proof of Lemma 1). State 1: Exactly 1 cus-
tomer arrives (probability p + q− 2p q). The downstream firm sells and restarts period
0 strategy. Thus upstream payoff is UW0 . State 2: 2 customers (1 old and 1 new) arrive
(probability p q). The downstream firm sells to the returning customer and restarts pro-
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duction. Thus upstream firm is in exactly the same situation as at the start of period 1
if a customer arrives, and the payoff is U1(1). State 3: No customer arrives (probability
(1− p)(1− q)). The payoff in this state (denoted byU2(0)) is derived as follows. If a cus-
tomer arrives tomorrow, the downstream firms sells the unit previously produced, and
restarts period 0 strategy. The upstream payoff is UW0 . If no one arrives tomorrow, the
upstream firm gets U2(0). Thus
U2(0) = 0+ δu
(
p UW0 + (1− p) U2(0)
)
. (A.5)
From the above,
U1(1) = (C− G) + δu
[
(p + q− 2p q)UW0 + p qU1(1) + (1− p)(1− q)U2(0)
]
. (A.6)
From equations (A.4), (A.5) and (A.6), we can solve for UW0 , and obtain:
UW0 =
(1− δu + δu p) δu p(C − G)
(1− δu)(1− δu + δu p (2− q))
=
δu p
1− δu + δu p (2− q)
U I0,
where the second step uses equation (3.6).‖
A.5 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
The optimal trade credit offer must be such that the downstream incentive constraint
binds, i.e. V I0 + τ
∗ C = max{0,VW0 }.
From (A.2), VW0 T 0 as p T pDℓ , where pDℓ is given by equation (3.4). Thus for p < pDℓ , τ∗
is given by V I0 + τ
∗C = 0, and for p ∈ [pD
ℓ
, pDic), τ
∗ is given by V I0 + τ
∗C = VW0 , where
pDic is given by equation (3.5). Finally, from equations (3.1) and (3.3), V
I
0 ≥ V
W
0 if p ≥ p
D
ic .
Thus for p ≥ pDic , τ
∗ = 0. Thus τ∗ =
1
C
(
max{0,VW0 ,V
I
0 } −V
I
0
)
, which is as stated.
Let us check that τ∗ ∈ [0, 1] in all cases. For p ≥ pDic , τ
∗ = 0. For p < pD
ℓ
, V I0 < V
W
0 < 0.
Thus τ∗ = −V I0/C > 0. Also, from (3.1), −V
I
0 6 C (since C 6 P). Thus τ∗ ∈ [0, 1].
Next, for p ∈ [pD
ℓ
, pDic), V
W
0 > 0 and V
W
0 > V
I
0 . Thus τ
∗ = (VW0 −V
I
0 )/C > 0. Also, from
equations (3.1) and (3.3), for p ∈ [pD
ℓ
, pDic),
VW0 −V
I
0
C
= 1−
δd p
1− δd
δd p (1− q) (P− C) + (1− δd)(1− δd q (1− p)) P
C (1− δd + δd p (2− q))
< 1.
Thus in this case 0 < τ∗ < 1.
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Next, let us check that τ∗ satisfies all the participation and incentive compatibility con-
straints. By construction the payoff under τ∗ satisfies the downstream incentive con-
straint.
Finally, the upstream participation constraint must hold. The upstream payoff under
optimal trade credit is given by U I0 − τ
∗C. Since τ∗ 6 1, it suffices to show that U I0 − C >
UW0 . Using equations (3.6) and (3.7), and solving for p, the upstream participation-in-
trade-credit constraint is given by
p > pUptc ≡
(
1− δu
δu
)
G(2− q) +
√
G (4C(1− q) + Gq2)
2(1− q)(C − G)
.
Clearly, this is only possible if pUptc 6 1, which is true if either G is low or δu is not very
low. It is also clear that if either G → 0 or δu → 1, p
U
ptc → 0 in which limiting case full
efficiency is attained.
For p ≥ pDic the immediate production strategy is chosen optimally even without trade
credit. The optimal trade credit satisfies the participation constraint of the upstream firm,
and ensures that the downstream firm follows the immediate production strategy for any
p such that pUptc 6 p < pDic). ‖
A.6 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
The discussion in section 5 proves the claim in the first sentence. Let us now check the up-
stream participation constraint. This always holds if max{VW0 (C), 0} = 0, as in this case
the downstream firm does not produce at all - generating a zero payoff for the upstream
firm, while a price of C∗D generates a positive payoff.
Next, let max{VW0 (C), 0} = V
W
0 (C). In this case the discounted price C
∗
D is such that
V I0 (C
∗
D) = V
W
0 (C). Let µ(x) ≡
xp
1− x + x p (2− q)
. Using equations (3.1) and (3.3), and
solving, we get C∗D = µ(δd)(C + (1− q δd)P).
Now, the upstream participation constraint is given by UW0 (C) 6 U I0(C∗D). Using equa-
tions (3.6) and (3.7), this simplifies to
µ(δu)(C− G) 6 C∗D − G = µ(δd)(C + (1− q δd)P)− G, (A.7)
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where the second step uses the expression for C∗D from above. Solving, we get
δu 6 δmaxu ≡
pδd(C + P(1− qδd))− G(1− δd + p(2− q)δd)
pC− G(1− p + pq) + (1− p(2− q))δd(pP + G(1− p(1− q))− pPqδd)
.
Note that the upstream participation constraint holds for any δd > δu if and only if δmaxu >
δd. Solving for p from δ
max
u = δd from above, and discarding the solution exceeding 1, this
is true whenever
p > pUpdp =
(1− δd)G
δd ((1− δdq)P− (1− q)G)
.
pUpdp is positive and it can be directly verified that it is below 1. Further, it is easy to see
that pUpdp → 0 if either G → 0 or δd → 1.‖
A.7 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
Recall from section 2 that the outside option for the downstream firm is given by C.
Therefore its outside option payoff is Vout ≡ max{0,V
W
0 (C),V
I
0 (C)}. Now suppose a
price C is offered to the downstream firm if it follows immediate production, and a price
C′ is offered if it follows wait-and-see. Clearly, trade credit must satisfy V I0 (C) + τ
∗C =
max{0,VW0 (C
′),V I0 (C),Vout}.
Suppose max{0,VW0 (C
′),V I0 (C),Vout} = V
W
0 (C
′). Since VW0 is decreasing in the input
price, it follows that C′ 6 C (otherwise the outside option is simply VW0 (C)). In this case
τ∗C = VW0 (C
′)− V I0 (C). Therefore U
T
0 (C) = U
I
0(C) +V
I
0 (C)− V
W
0 (C
′), which increases
in C′, and therefore the optimal value of C′ is simply C. It follows that
max{0,VW0 (C
′),V I0 (C),Vout} = max{0,V
W
0 (C),V
I
0 (C)}. If the maximum is V
I
0 (C), trade
credit is zero. Therefore only two cases need to be considered.
Case 1: max{0,VW0 (C),V
I
0 (C)} = 0. In this case τ
∗C = −V I0 (C). Therefore
UT0 (C) = U
I
0(C)− τ
∗C = U I0(C) +V
I
0 (C)
=
δd p P
1− δd
+ p C
(δu − δd)
(1− δu)(1− δd)
−
(
1− δu(1− p)
1− δu
)
G. (A.8)
If δu > δd, the optimal policy is therefore C = P. In this case τ
∗P = −V I0 (P) implies
τ∗ = 1. Next, if δu < δd, the optimal policy is to lower the price to C = C
∗
D and put
τ∗ = 0, where C∗D is as in section 5. Finally, any C ∈ [0, P] with τ
∗C = −V I0 (C) is optimal
if δu = δd.
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Case 2: max{0,VW0 (C),V
I
0 (C)} = V
W
0 (C). In this case
UT0 (C) =
δd p P
1− δd
+ p C
(δu − δd)
(1− δu)(1− δd)
−
(
1− δu(1− p)
1− δu
)
G−VW0 (C). (A.9)
But maximizing this with respect to C is the same asmaximizing the expression forUT0 (C)
given by equation (A.8). Therefore, as before, if δu < δd the optimal policy is τ
∗ = 0 and
C = C∗D.
If δu > δd, the optimal policy is to have the highest possible input price that satisfies
the downstream participation constraint. Now, suppose τ < 1. Then it is possible to
raise τ further, and also raise C to keep the downstream firm indifferent. This increases
the upstream payoff. Therefore the optimal policy sets τ∗ = 1, and the associated input
price satisfying the downstream participation constraint (as given in the statement of the
proposition).‖
A.8 PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
From equations (A.8) and (A.9), the upstream payoff from offering trade credit τ and
charging price C is
UT0 (C) =
δd p P
1− δd
+ p C
(δu − δd)
(1− δu)(1− δd)
−
(
1− δu(1− p)
1− δu
)
G− φ,
where φ ≡ max{0,VW0 (C)}. It follows that
∂
∂C
UT0 (C) = p
(δu − δd)
(1− δu)(1− δd)
−
∂φ
∂C
.
Since C is an increasing function of C, φ is decreasing weakly in C. Further, as C falls,
C falls, and below a certain level of C, VW0 (C) is necessarily positive. In this case φ de-
creases strictly in C. It follows that if δu − δd is not large (whatever the sign of the term),
the second term (which is positive) can dominate, and in that case C should be as high as
possible. It follows that the optimal policy is in this case is as in the first part of propo-
sition 6: offer full trade credit and the highest price satisfying downstream participation
constraint. This proves that there exists δ∗ < δd such that for all δu > δ∗, the stated policy
is optimal.‖
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A.9 PROOF OF COROLLARY 2
In offering trade credit, the upstream firm must satisfy the downstream participation
constraint given by V I0 (C) + τ C = φ, where φ ≡ max{0,V
W
0 (C)}. Given any τ ∈ (0, 1), Ĉ
solves the equation above where Ĉ =
δd p P− (1− δd) φ
(1− τ) (1− δd) + pδd
. Suppose the outside option
C < P. Then the optimal input price is given by C∗ = min
[
C, Ĉ
]
. If φ = 0 and τ = 1,
Ĉ = P, but C∗ = C < P. And if φ = VW0 (C), C
∗ could be even lower than C.‖
A.10 PROOF OF COROLLARY 3
The payoff of the downstream firm under trade credit is as in section 4, except in each
period after the initial period an extra repayment of rtτC must be made. The payoff is
thus given by
VT0 (C) = −(1− τ)C +
δd p(P− C− rt τ C)
1− δd
= V I0 (C) + τ C
(
1−
δd p rt
1− δd
)
.
In offering a trade credit and price policy, the upstream firm must satisfy the down-
stream participation constraint given by V I0 (C) + τ C
(
1−
δd p rt
1− δd
)
= φ, where φ ≡
max{0,VW0 (C)}. Given any τ ∈ (0, 1), C
∗ solves the equation above where
C∗ =
δd p P− (1− δd) φ
(1− τ) (1− δd) + pδd(1+ rt τ)
.
The upstream payoff is then given byUT0 (C
∗) = (C∗−G)+
δup(C∗ − G)
1− δu
− τC∗
(
1−
δu p rt
1− δu
)
.
Substituting the value of C∗ from above and differentiating with respect to τ,
∂UT0 (C
∗)
∂τ
=
p(1+ rt)(δu − δd)(δd p P− (1− δd)φ)
(1− δu) ((1− τ)(1− δd) + δd p(1+ rt τ))
2
.
For any given rt > 0, this is strictly positive if δu > δd. Therefore, for δu > δd, τ∗ = 1.
Using this,UT0 (C
∗) =
δu(δd p P− (1− δd)φ)− δd G(1− (1− p)δu)
(1− δu)δd
, which is independent
of rt. We can therefore set rt = 0 without loss of generality.
For δu < δd, if τ
∗ = 0, rt is obviously irrelevant. Further, if for some δu < δd, τ ∈ (0, 1),
we have
∂UT0 (C
∗)
∂rt
=
p(1− τ)τ(δu − δd)(δd p P− (1− δd)φ)
(1− δu) ((1− τ)(1− δd) + δd p(1+ rt τ))
2
.
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Clearly, the upstream payoff in this case is strictly decreasing in rt, and therefore it is
optimal to have rt = 0.‖
A.11 PROOF OF LEMMA 3
UUI0 is the same as U
I
0 given by (3.6). Next, let us calculate U
UW
0 . The upstream firm
produces once the downstream firm places an order after selling a unit. In period 0,
the downstream firm spends C and starts production. Thus the upstream firm earns C
in period 0. In period 1 there are two possible states - either a customer arrives or no
customer arrives. Let U1(0) be the value from period 1 onwards in the second state. If a
customer arrives, the downstream firm makes a sale, and the upstream firm produces in
period 1. Thus the payoff in period 1 is −G, and let the value from period 2 onwards be
denoted by U2(1). Thus
UUW0 = C + δu (p (−G + δuU2(1)) + (1− p)U1(0)) . (A.10)
U1(0) can be calculated as follows:
U1(0) = 0+ δup (−G + δuU2(1)) + δu(1− p)U1(0). (A.11)
Let us now calculate U2(1). Since the upstream firm produces in period 1, it sells a unit
at the start of period 2. Subsequently, there are two possible states exactly as in period 1.
Denoting the probability that no customer arrives at start of period 3 by ψ, we have
U2(1) = C + (1− ψ) δu (−G + δuU2(1)) + ψ δuU1(0). (A.12)
Now, since the upstream firm produces in period 1, the downstream firm can only pro-
duce in period 2. Any customer arriving at the start of period 2 cannot be served. In
period 3, no customer arrives if there is neither any returning customer from period 2,
nor any new customer arrives in period 3. Therefore we have20 ψ = (1 − p)(1 − p q).
Substituting the value of ψ in (A.12), and using equations (A.10) to (A.12), we get the
required expression for UUW0 .‖
20The probability that there is a returning customer is the probability that a customer arrives (p) times the
probability that he returns (q). Thus the probability of no returning customer is (1− p q). The probability
of no new customer arriving in period 3 is (1− p).
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A.12 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7
Let ∆U ≡ UUW0 − U
UI
0 . From lemma 3, we have
∂UUI0
∂p
=
δu(C− G)
1− δu
, and
∂UUW0
∂p
=[
δu(δuC− G)
1− δu
] [
1− δ2up
2q
1+ δup(1− δuq) + δ2up
2q
]
. The first term in square brackets is lower
than
∂UUI0
∂p
, and the second term in square brackets is less than 1. It follows that
∂∆U
∂p
< 0.
Next, lim
p→1
∆U = −
δuC− G
1− δ2u
< 0, and limp→0 ∆U = G > 0. Finally, ∆U is continuous in
p. The facts above imply that there exists a unique p ∈ (0, 1) (denoted by pUic ) that satisfies
∆U = 0, and ∆U R 0 as p ⋚ pUic .‖
A.13 PROOF OF LEMMA 4
In period 0, the downstream firm spends C and starts production. In period 1 there are
two possible states - either a customer arrives or no customer arrives. Let Y1 be the value
in the first state and Y0 be the value in the second state. Then
VUW0 = − C + δd pY1 + δd (1− p)Y0. (A.13)
Now,
Y0 = 0+ δd (pY1 + (1− p)Y0) . (A.14)
Let us calculate Y1 next. In period 1, if a customer arrives, the downstream firm sells the
output produced in period 0, and gets P. Following a sale, the downstream firm places
an order for a unit of input, and produces a unit in period 2. Any customer arriving in
period 2 does not get served, but might return next period. At the start of period 3, the
downstream firm has 1 unit of output to sell.
In period 3, no customer arrives (see footnote 20) with probability is (1− p)(1− p q), and
the payoff is Y0. If at least one customer arrives, the situation is exactly like the state in
period 1 in which a customer arrives and the subsequent payoff is Y1.
21 It follows that
Y1 = P− δd C + δ
2
d ((1− (1− p)(1− p q))Y1 + (1− p)(1− p q)Y0) .
21Any customer who does not get served in period 3 is lost completely since the downstream firm can
only sell the next unit of output in period 5. Thus whether 1 or 2 customers arrive in period 3 makes no
difference.
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Using this as well as equations (A.13) and (A.14), we obtain the stated expression for
VUW0 .‖
A.14 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8
The proof proceeds through the following lemma.
Lemma 5 VUI0 −V
UW
0 is strictly increasing in p.
Proof: Since VUI0 = V
I
0 , using the values from equations (3.1) and lemma 4, and simpli-
fying, we get
∆V ≡ VUI0 −V
UW
0 =
δd p
1− δd
[
(P− C)
1+ (1/ f (p))
−
C(1− δd)
1+ f (p)
]
,
where f (p) = p δd (1− δd q) + p
2 δ2d q. Note that f
′(p) > 0. Thus the first term inside the
square brackets on the right hand side of the above equation is strictly increasing in p,
and the second term is strictly decreasing in p. Thus the term inside the square bracket
is strictly increasing in p. The coefficient of this term is also strictly increasing in p. This
proves the result.‖
For p close to 0, f (p) is close to 0, and ∆V < 0. As p → 1, f (p) → δd. Thus limp→1 ∆V =
δd
1−δ2d
(δdP − C) > 0 where the inequality follows from the fact that for the downstream
firm to invest at all we must have δdP > C (proposition 1). Combined with the lemma
above, and the fact that ∆V is continuous in p, we conclude that there exists a unique
0 < p c < 1 such that ∆V = 0 at p = p c. Using the values of VUI0 and V
UW
0 ,
p c =
1− δd q
2δd q
(√
1+
4q (1− δd)
(1− δd q)2
C
(P− C)
− 1
)
.
From lemma 5, for p > p c, V
UI
0 > V
UW
0 .
From proposition 2, V I0 > V
W
0 for p > p
D
ic . Using the values of p c and p
D
ic , it is easy (but
laborious) to see that
(pDic)
2 − (p c)
2 =
(
2 q (1− δd)C
(1− δd q) ((P− C)− q (δd P− C))
)2 (q (δd P− C)
(P− C)
)
> 0,
where the last step follows from the fact that the relevant case for downstream production
to take place at all is δd P > C. Since p
D
ic and p c are both positive, the above shows that
pDic > p c. It follows that for p > pDic , VUI0 > VUW0 .‖
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A.15 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9
Prepayment is made if the upstream firm has an incentive to wait without it, and both
UPP0 ≥ U
UW
0 as well as V
PP
0 ≥ V
UW
0 . Since a prepayment scheme can be represented by a
total transfer of θ C , UPP0 = U
UI
0 + θC, and V
PP
0 = V
UI
0 − θC.
WheneverUUW0 > U
UI
0 , let θ
∗ be such that upstream constraint bindsUUI0 + θ
∗C = UUW0 .
The downstream sector then participates in prepayment if VUI0 − θ
∗C ≥ VUW0 . Let us
check that 0 < θ∗ < 1. For UUW0 > U
UI
0 , clearly θ
∗ > 0. Further, from lemma 3, UUW0 <
C+ δup(δuC−G)/(1− δu). Using the expression forUUI0 from the same lemma, it follows
that UUW0 −U
UI
0 < G− δupC/(1− δu) < G. Thus θ
∗ < G/C < 1.
Let us now establish a few facts that we then use to prove the result. Fact 1: as C ↓
G/δu, p
U
ic ↑ 1, and thus p
U
ic = 1 for all C 6 G/δu. Fact 2: from section A.12, we have
∂(UUW0 −U
UI
0 )
∂p < 0.
Next, pDpp solves V
UI
0 − V
UW
0 = θ
∗C where θ∗C = max{0,UUW0 − U
UI
0 }. As p → 1,
UUW0 −U
UI
0 →
δuC−G
1−δ2u
. Therefore, we have Fact 3: for C 6 G/δu, as p → 1, θ∗C → 0.
We now proceed with the proof. First, let us show that pDpp exists, is unique, and, for
C 6 G/δu, is bounded away from 1. Consider the equation VUI0 − VUW0 = θ∗C. From
section A.14, at p = p c, the left hand side is 0. The right hand side is positive for p < pUic .
But, from fact 1, pUic = 1 for C 6 G/δu. Since p c < 1, the right hand side is positive at
p = p c.
At p = 1, for C 6 G/δu, the right hand side is 0 (fact 3), while the left hand side is positive
and at its largest value, which follows from lemma 5 in section A.14. Finally, using the
same lemma as well as fact 2, VUI0 −V
UW
0 − θ
∗C is strictly increasing in p and this is also
continuous in p. These imply that pDpp ∈ (pc, 1) exists, is unique, and is bounded away
from 1. Therefore, using fact 1, we have the following:
For C 6 G/δu, pDpp < pUic . (∗)
Finally, it is easy to see from equation (3.5) that for δdP > C, p
D
ic < 1. Now, condition (2.1)
holds by assumption, and since rm = (1− δm)/δm > (1− δd)/δd, we have p(P − G) >
(1− δd)/δd. Since the relevant case is p < 1 (for p = 1 no scope for prepayment arises),
we have (P − G) > (1− δd)/δd, which in turn implies δdP > G. Therefore for C close
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to G, we do have δdP > C, and therefore p
D
ic < 1. Combining this with fact 1, we can
conclude that:
There is some Ĉ ∈ (G,G/δu] such that for C 6 Ĉ, pDic < pUic . (∗∗)
From (∗) and (∗∗), for C 6 Ĉ 6 G/δu, we havemax{pDic , pDpp} < pUic . In other words, there
is ∆ 6 1−δuδu G such that for C−G 6 ∆, the interval specified in the statement of the propo-
sition is non-empty. On this interval the downstream firm produces immediately, and the
upstream firm is induced also to produce immediately through prepayment. Therefore
prepayment restores efficiency on this interval.‖
A.16 PROOF OF SUFFICIENCY OF CONDITION (2.1)
First, note that the total surplus from immediate production of both input and final good
is always greater than that from immediate production of input but a wait-and-see strat-
egy for producing the final good. This is because once the input is produced (and the
cost G expended), there is no gain from waiting one or more periods to produce the final
good. There are no further costs of producing the final good, and therefore no interest
cost is saved by waiting. On the other hand, by waiting some final good sales are missed.
Therefore we simply need to compare the surplus from immediate production of both
input and final good (denoted by SI0) to the surplus from a strategy of waiting to produce
input and immediate production of final good (denoted by SUW0 ).
These surplus values can be derived simply by setting C = G and adding the corre-
sponding values for upstream and downstream firms: SI0 = V
I
0 (G) +U
I
0(G), and S
UW
0 =
VUW0 (G) +U
UW
0 (G). Let these be evaluated with respect to some interest rate r and dis-
count factor δ = 1/(1+ r). We get
SI0 = −G +
δ p(P− G)
1− δ
,
SUW0 =
δ p(P− G)
(1− δ)(1+ δ p(1− δ q (1− p)))
.
Now, immediate production of both input and final good is efficient if SI0 > SUW0 . This is
true if
P− G
G
> (1− δ)(Z + 1)
p δ(Z + 2)
,
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where Z ≡ pδ(1− (1− p)δ). Note that (1− δ)/δ = r. Further, since Z 6 1, (Z + 1)/(Z +
2) 6 2/3 < 1. Therefore a sufficient condition to ensure SI0 > SUW0 is P−GG > rp . Since
it must be that the appropriate interest rate r 6 max{ru, rd} ≡ rm, it is sufficient to have
P−G
G >
rm
p which is the stated condition.‖
12 APPENDIX B
We argued in section 6 that if the upstream firm earns a margin (C−G) that is high (low)
relative to the downstreammargin (P−C), the upstream (downstream) firm is also likely
to face easier credit terms. In this section we sketch an argument to show how this might
arise.
We assume that a bank knows the investment environment (i.e. knows the values of
p, q, P,C,G) but cannot observe each act of sale of input or output or provision of inter-
firm credit. The bank lends over a certain fixed term that encompasses several production
and sales opportunities. Let n denote the number of potential sales periods inside the
lending period - i.e. if both firms produced immediately and if a customer arrived in each
period there would be n sales over the term of the bank loan.
For simplicity assume that both firms have an incentive to produce immediately. If this is
not the case, the algebra below would be more complicated, but it would not change the
nature of the calculations.
The number of sales k in n periods follows a Binomial distribution with success probabil-
ity p. Let f (k) ≡
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k. Suppose the competitive rate of interest is r. For a
loan of L the competitive bank must earn an expected return of (1 + r)L. Therefore the
break-even condition is
K∗
∑
k=0
f (k)k(P − C) +
(
1−
K∗
∑
k=0
f (k)
)
L(1+ rd) = L(1+ r), (B.1)
where rd is the rate charged by the bank to the downstream firm and where K
∗ is such
that K∗(P− C) 6 L(1+ rd) 6 (K∗ + 1)(P− C).
The left hand side of (B.1) can be written as
n
∑
k=0
f (k)min{k(P − C), L(1 + rd)}. Since for
some values of k > 0, k(P − C) < L(1 + rd), it must be that rd > r. Further, as (P− C)
41
falls, min(k(P− C), L(1+ rd)) falls weakly for all k and strictly for some k. It follows that
the left hand side of (B.1) falls as (P− C) falls. Thus to satisfy (B.1), rd must rise.
A similar calculation determines ru (in condition (B.1), replace (P − C) by (C − G) and
rd by ru). Since rd decreases in (P − C), it is also immediate that rd R ru as (C − G) R
(P− C).
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